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Some Remarks on the Use of Force
Against Terrorism in Contemporary
International Law and the Role of the
Security Council
JAUME SAURA*
I. INTRODUCTION
September 11th is said to mark a turning point in the history
and dynamics of international relations. Only time can say whether
this is the case, but it is beyond doubt that this outrageous attack
pointed out Afghanistan and the Taliban as the headquarters and
safe haven of today's most dangerous terrorist organization. It
moved the victim of the attack, the United States of America,
together with its most faithful ally, to launch an attack on
Afghanistan, depose its radically fundamentalist government, and
keep a military presence in the area afterwards, while looking for
the intellectual authors of the aggression. This action, though
triggered by the September 11th attacks, must be put in the
context of the struggle against international terrorism, which the
international community has undertaken for the last forty years.
Thus, the purpose of this Article is twofold. Part II is a
general overlook of the existing treaty framework. In Part III, I
analyze the approach to international terrorism adopted by the
United Nations Security Council, both before and after the
September 11th attacks. I shall discuss how the Security Council
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has considered certain terrorist actions as threats to international
peace and security and has acted accordingly, though not always in
a predictable and coherent manner. I shall conclude that the issue
of terrorism has been on the agenda of the Security Council but
that it is not the best-suited organ to produce general norms
(legislate) on this topic.
In Part IV, I make a specific reference to the use of force by
the United States and the United Kingdom against the Taliban
regime in Afghanistan, which has been widely considered as an
exercise of the right to self-defense. I will argue that this case did
not meet the requirements for self-defense and conclude that the
United States had an explicit will to act without the backing of the
Security Council on an occasion where, unlike in the more recent
Iraqi crisis, an armed action would have gathered unanimous
support among its members. Finally, in Part V, I conclude with my
belief that the international community and the Security Council
lost a great opportunity to reaffirm the institutional nature of using
armed force in contemporary international law.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL TREATY FRAMEWORK AGAINST
TERRORISM
Terrorism has become a growing concern of the international
community since the early sixties.! Criminal acts aimed to provoke
terror among the civilian population, usually with a political
purpose, were also known in older times. It was not until after the
Second World War that terrorism acquired an international
dimension, which resulted from the increase of transnational
means of transport (e.g., hijacking of aircrafts and vessels) and the
generalization of freedom movements (not always clearly
1. LORI FISLER DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND
MATERIALS 416 (4th ed. 2001).
2. See, e.g., James Blount Griffin, Note, A Predictive Framework for the Effectiveness
of International Criminal Tribunals, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 405, 422-23 (2001)
(discussing the assassinations of politicians and royal persons in the turn of the twentieth
century (Franz Ferdinand)); Cara Hirsh, Policing Undercover Agents in the United
Kingdom: Whether the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act Complies with Regional
Human Rights Obligations, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1282, 1291-95 (2002) (explaining the
national struggle in Ireland after World War I); Christopher C. Burns, Re-examining the
Prisoner of War Status of PLO Fedayeen, 22 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 943, 996-97
(1997) (explaining the actions of the Irgun and Stern groups in Palestine immediately after
World War II).
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supported by the principle of self-determination).3 In any case, this
general concern has not translated into the drafting of a single,
comprehensive covenant to fight the different faces that
international terrorism shows around the world. On the contrary,
at the UN and its specialized agencies, on top of more or less
rhetorical condemnations, member states have been able to agree
only on treaties that deal with specific forms and manifestations of
international terrorism. Thus, there are now up to twelve universal
treaties that deal with narrow expressions of terrorist action, such
as the unlawful seizure of aircraft,4 other unlawful acts against the
safety of civil aviation,' unlawful acts against the safety of maritime
navigation,6 the safety of internationally protected persons,7 the
8taking of hostages, etc. More recently, the UN has adopted the
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings9 and the International Convention for the Suppression
of the Financing of Terrorism.'o All these conventions are
3. See Martin Walker, A Brief History of Terrorism, EUROPE MAG., Oct. 2001 at 26,
available at http://www.eurunion.org/magazine/0110/p26.htm.
4. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22
U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105.
5. Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft,
Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2491, 704 U.N.T.S. 219; Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 546, 974
U.N.T.S. 177; Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports
Serving International Civil Aviation, Feb. 24, 1988, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-19, 1589
U.N.T.S. 474.
6. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed
Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, Mar. 10, 1988, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 101-1,
1678 U.N.T.S. 304; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, S. TREATY DOC. No. 101-1, 1678 U.N.T.S. 222.
7. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035
U.N.T.S. 167.
8. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, T.I.A.S.
No. 11,081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205.
9. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, G.A. Res.
164, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., Supp. No. 37, U.N. Doc. A/52/653 (1998).
10. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, G.A.
Res. 109, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 49, Agenda Item 160, at 408, U.N. Doc.
A/54/109 (1999). There are also a number of international agreements concerning
different aspects of terrorism at the regional level. See Convention to Prevent and Punish
the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion
that are of International Significance, Feb. 2, 1971, OAS, 27 U.S.T. 3949, 1986 U.N.T.S.
195; European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Jan. 27, 1977, Europ. T.S.
No. 90; Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Apr. 22, 1998, available at
http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/league/terrorism98.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2004);
Convention of the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, July 14, 1999, OAU, available
2003]
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currently in force with a degree of participation that ranges
between 79 ratifications to more than 170 state parties."
The agreements adopted under the aegis of the UN share a
very similar structure. First, they define in as precise terms as
possible the nature and scope of the unlawful behavior that
constitutes their object. 12 Second, they oblige signatories to
undertake essentially two types of commitments relating to the
prevention and suppression of those terrorist acts.
First, parties must treat the specific terrorist acts defined by
each covenant, or actions leading to such acts, that are undertaken
in their territory as against the territory of another country. 3 In
fact, one can consider this rule of conduct a general norm of
customary international law based upon the territorial sovereignty
of states and thus mandatory to all states, irrespective of them
being parties to these treaties. International jurisprudence 14 and
several UN General Assembly resolutions 5 have established the
responsibility of states for the use of their territory as a base of
operations for terrorist, subversive, or other armed groups against
at http://www.africa-union.org/Official-documents/Treaties-%2Conventions-%2Protocols/
Algiers-convention%20on%20Terrorism.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2003).
11. United Nations Conventions Deposited with the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, available at http://www.un.org/english/terrorism.asp (last visited Apr. 22, 2003)
(providing: the text of treaties pertaining to terrorism recently deposited with the
Secretary-General, UN conventions deposited with other depositories, and regional
conventions in the authentic languages, the titles of all treaties deposited with Secretary-
General in the six official languages, depositary notifications issued by the Secretary-
General in his capacity as depositary of multilateral treaties, and the status of each
document).
12. E.g., G.A. Res. 109, supra note 10, at art. 2.
13. E.g., id. at arts. 9-11.
14. See Island of Palmas Case (United States v. Nethetherlands.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 839
(Perm Ct. Arb. 1928).
15. See G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 222, U.N. Doc.
A/8018 (1970) (declaration on principles of international law); G.A. Res. 3314, U.N.
GAOR, 29th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314 (1975) (definition of aggression).
These resolutions were adopted by general consensus of the Members of the United
Nations. According to the former, "[e]very State has the duty to refrain from organizing,
instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another state
or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission
of such acts...." G.A. Res. 2625, supra, at 339. The second resolution defines one form of
aggression as "[t]he sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars
or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State...." G.A. Res.
3314, supra, at 3.
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the sovereignty of another state. The UN Charter considers this
sort of "permissive" activity an illegal form of "use of force."'
16
Second, parties must cooperate in the criminal and
jurisdictional field to facilitate the punishment of those guilty of
the crimes specifically mentioned in each treaty. 7 In particular,
they must incorporate that concrete conduct and appropriate.
foreseeable punishment into their criminal code. s Then, parties
must either prosecute or extradite the person within their
jurisdiction who is suspected of committing this act in the territory
of another party.'9 Thus, the treaties provide for universal
jurisdiction and act as extradition agreements among parties. In
some cases, but not all, they explicitly exclude the possibility of
considering those terrorist acts as political crimes.
With this constellation of treaties in force, the international
community can consider international terrorism a crime of
international relevance (similar to, for instance, international drug
trafficking) that deserves judicial cooperation among states. It is
not an international crime, however, in the sense of generating
individual international responsibility as, for instance, war crimes
or crimes against humanity. In fact, even if terrorism and drug
trafficking were among the crimes included in the draft statute of
the International Criminal Court, the Rome Conference rejected
the competence of the Court in such matters.20 Therefore, the
16. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
17. E.g., G.A. Res. 109, supra note 10, at arts. 4, 7.
18. See DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 1, at 405.
19. Id. at 404.
20. Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, Addendum, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1 (1998), available at
http://www.un.org/law/icc/docs.htm. Curiously enough, the origin of the Court, after the
postponement of the topic by the General Assembly in the fifties, is a 1998 request by
Trinidad and Tobago to resume work on an international criminal court with jurisdiction
to include drug irafficking. Press Release, U.N., UN Diplomatic Conference Concludes in
Rome with Decision to Establish Permanent International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. No.
L/ROM/22 (July 17, 1998). Schrijver explains that "[djuring the Rome conference
Algeria, India, Sri Lanka and Turkey proposed that the jurisdiction of a future
international criminal court should comprise terrorism as a crime against humanity.
However, as a result of the long-standing lack of agreement on the definition of terrorism
this did not materialize." Nico Schrijver, Responding to International Terrorism: Moving
the Frontiers of International Law for 'Enduring Freedom'?, 48 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 271,
289 (2001). Nevertheless, the author concludes that "[i]n view of their planned and
deliberately widespread and systematic nature, the 11 September 2001 attacks come within
the purview of the description of Article 7 on crimes against humanity of the Rome)
Statute for the International Criminal Court." Schrijver, supra, at 291.
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second dimension of the treaties, including the duty to prosecute
or extradite, becomes the most relevant element of this agreed
upon system. In the absence of a conventional basis, general
international law does not impose any duty to extradite a person
for ordinary crimes.21
This form of conventional cooperation, which is praiseworthy
in many ways, still has obvious disadvantages if the fight against
international terrorism must be general and worldwide. First,
international treaties are only binding to parties.2 Thus, the duty
to extradite disappears if any of the states in which the terrorist act
took place, or where the terrorist person has hidden, are not a
party to the relevant convention. Second, these treaties refer to
very specific acts of terrorism carefully defined in the first articles
of each convention.23 The provisions of such treaties cannot cover
any terrorist act that does not fall precisely under such definition.
The domestic law of two states could consider a presumed criminal
to be of a "terrorist" nature, but the criminal would not be
extradited from one such country to another if the criminal act
does not fall within the purview of the relevant treaty's definition.
This excludes situations where the states have their own, more
general, bilateral agreement in force.
Therefore, under this multilateral treaty system, the extent of
each member's duties towards other members depends on
commonality of treaty ratification. Many terrorist activities may go
unpunished, at least at the international level, because they have
not yet been included in any treaty. A reasonable solution to these
limitations would be to draft a comprehensive treaty against
"international terrorism" in all of its forms, and then foster
maximum participation to it, which would remain voluntary.
21. See Juan Antonio Carrillo Salcedo, Bilan de Recherches de la Section de Langue
Francaise du Centre D'tAtude et de Recherche de L'Academie, in CENTRE FOR STUDIES
AND RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1988: THE
LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 19, 23, 39-47 (Centre D'Etude et de
Recherche de Droit, Studies & Research in International Law ed., 1988). See, e.g., Jochen
A. Frowein, The Present State of Research Carried Out by the English-speaking Section of
the Centre for Studies and Research, in CENTRE FOR STUDIES AND RESEARCH IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1988: THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. 55, 78-85 (Centre D'Etude et de Recherche de Droit,
Studies & Research in International Law ed., 1988).
22. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
art. 26, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
23. E.g., G.A. Res. 109, supra note 10, at art. 2.
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Nevertheless, this is not easy. The UN unsuccessfully tried this
strategy during the seventies. It established a special committee
between 1972 and 1979, but terminated it because it was
impossible for committee members to agree upon a common
definition of "international terrorism., 24 In fact, the resolutions
adopted through the years by the General Assembly condemning
terrorism do not contain a definition of terrorism, though some
elements may be deduced from the piecemeal resolutions2H More
recently, in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks, a scholar
stated that the reason for the 1996 failure to adopt a
comprehensive convention against terrorism was this definitional
problem. 6 Domestic law is also of little use in this respect because
the states' definitions are so inconsistent in practice - depending
on the existence of a local terrorist group or clandestine support to
neighboring terrorist groups - that it is impossible to derive a
customary notion of international terrorism.27
24. See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, 1979 U.N.Y.B.
1146, U.N. Sales No. E.82.I.1. In that particular case, newly independent countries were
afraid that too wide of a definition of terrorism would include legitimate national
liberation movements, whose armed actions would be allegedly covered by the universal
right to self-determination recognized by the UN.
25. The closest thing to an internationally agreed upon definition is the General
Assembly's reference to "[ciriminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror
in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political reasons." G.A.
Res. 49/60, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 21, at 303-04, U.N. Doc. A/49/60 (1994).
See also G.A. Res. 57/27, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/27 (2003)
(reiterating the working definition for terrorism created in G.A. Res. 49/60).
26. See Joaquin Alcaide Fernindez, La Guerra contra el terrorismo: i Una OPA hostil
al Derecho de la comunidad internacional?, 53 REVISTA ESPAIfOLA DE DERECHO
INTERNACIONAL 289, 292-293 (2001). The Ad Hoc Committee is nevertheless meeting
regularly and is promptly expected to elaborate on "a draft comprehensive convention on
international terrorism." G.A. Res. 57/27, supra note 25, 18.
27. NATIONAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS ON THE PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION
OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/22, U.N. Sales No.
E/F.02.V.7 (compiling domestic legislation). Obviously there are as many definitions of
what constitutes international terrorism as authors who have dealt with the topic, but since
"the teachings of the most qualified publicists of the various nations" are not a source of
international law, I shall skip what would otherwise become too lengthy of a presentation.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, para. 1, 59 Stat. 1055;
33 U.N.T.S. 993.
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III. THE ROLE PLAYED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN THE FIGHT
AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM BEFORE SEPTEMBER 11,
2001
A. Measures Adopted in Specific Cases
Given the limitations of the treaty system established at the
UN on international terrorism, the Security Council has used its
powers to act against terrorism in some very particular instances.
The Security Council is the only entity in contemporary
international law legally allowed to "determine" the existence of a
"threat to the peace," 28 which it can do with complete freedom, in
accordance with its own politically discretionary criteria. Before
September 11, 2001, the Security Council had considered three
specific terrorist actions as threats to the peace and had acted
accordingly. First, the 1988 explosion of Pan American World
Airways flight 103 resulted in over 200 deaths. Two Libyan agents
and, indirectly, the Libyan government, were accused of this
29attack. Second, there was the 1995 attempted murder of Egyptian
President Hosni Mubarak during an official trip to Ethiopia. The
government of Sudan was accused of this attempted
assassination. ° Finally, the 1998 bombing of the U.S. Embassies in
Nairobi and Dar es Salaam resulted in over 200 deaths. The
Taliban government of Afghanistan, not recognized by the United
States, and the leader of the terrorist organization al Qaeda,
Osama bin Laden, were accused of these bombings.3'
Chapter VII of the UN Charter is the base of resulting
resolutions, which are also very similar in their general structures.
They begin by considering Libya, Sudan, and the Taliban
government as threats to international peace and security because
28. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
29. DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 1, at 371.
30. See S.C. Res. 1054, U.N. SCOR, 51st Sess., 3660th rntg., at 1, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1054 (1996).
31. DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 1, at 728.
32. See S.C. Res. 731, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3033d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/731
(1992); S.C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3063d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (1992)
(pertaining to Libya). See also S.C. Res. 1044, U.N. SCOR, 51st Sess., 3627th mtg., U.N.
Doc. SIRES/1044 (1996); S.C. Res. 1054, supra note 30 (pertaining to Sudan). See also S.C.
Res. 1189, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3915th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1189 (1998); S.C. Res.
1267, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4051st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (1999); S.C. Res. 1333,
U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4251st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (2000) (pertaining to the
Taliban).
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they do not comply with its commands. These commands are
mainly: (1) to stop supporting terrorist elements in their territory
and (2) to extradite those held in suspicion of actually committing
the specific terrorist attack.
The gravity of the cases in Libya and Afghanistan, in
comparison with the case in Sudan, justifies the differing nature of
the specific sanctions adopted against each country. Libya and
Afghanistan suffer from an aerial and arms embargo, among other
measures.33 Meanwhile, Sudan is only sanctioned with lowered
diplomatic and consular relations and restricted entry and transit
of its political leaders, officials, and military.34 Curiously, the
measures taken against Libya and Afghanistan are not identically
in force against the Taliban. Nor did the Security Council adopt
either of the two main measures taken against Sudan, which were
only "recommended" in the case of the Taliban.35
Thus, Security Council action arguably has a sort of common
pattern. 36 At the same time, the Council acts with complete
discretion in selecting which terrorist attacks deserve its
attention.3 7 This discretion also applies to the degree of
punishment levied against states and governments accused of
supporting terrorist groups and elements. 8 The Council seems to
dispose of an arsenal of possible sanctions before selecting what it
considers the most appropriate measure. If predictability and
33. S.C. Res. 748, supra note 32, 1$ 4, 5; S.C. Res. 1333, supra note 32, 5. States are
also obliged to stop any military assistance to these governments. S.C. Res. 748, supra, 5;
S.C. Res. 1044, supra note 32, at 2; S.C. Res. 1333, supra note 32, 1 5. In the case of
Afghanistan, the measures include the closure of the Taliban and Afghan Airlines offices
in foreign countries and the freezing of bin Laden's and al Qaeda's financial resources. Id.
8.
34. S.C. Res. 1054, supra note 30, at 2.
35. Compare S.C. Res. 748, supra note 32, with S.C. Res. 1054, supra note 30, and S.C.
Res. 1333, supra note 32.
36. The Security Council issues mandates for signatories to carry out within a certain
time limit in conjunction with non-forcible sanctions in case of non-compliance.
37. See Statement by the President of the Security Council on July 29, 1994, U.N.
SCOR, 2, U.N Doc. S/PRST/1994/40 (1994); Statement by the President of the Security
Council on May 30, 1995, U.N. SCOR, 9 1, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/1994/40 (1995); Statement
by the President of the Security Council on March 4, 1996, U.N. SCOR, 1, U.N. Doc.
S/PRST/1994/40 (1996). Many such attacks that took place during those years did not even
make it onto the Council's agenda or only received general condemnations.
38. See U.N. CHARTER art. 39; S.C. Res. 748, supra note 32; S.C. Res. 1054, supra
note 30; S.C. Res. 1333, supra note 32. Note that the resolutions against Libya and
Afghanistan contain strict military sanctions, while the Security Council did not levy any
military sanctions against Sudan.
20031
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consistency are requirements, or at least desirable features, of any
sort of jurisprudence, it is clear that the practice of the Security
Council in dealing with international terrorism does not meet any
of these qualifications.
In any case, these precedents contribute to the growing
perception of international terrorism as a threat to international
peace and security. In addition, they move the Security Council to
adopt some resolutions that do not deal with particular cases of
terrorist attacks but with the phenomenon in general. The two
main decisions are Resolutions 1269" and 1373, adopted less than
two years apart, which contain very different wording.40 I shall deal
with the first of these resolutions in the next paragraphs and leave
the second one for the next section.
B. A Resolution Dealing with International Terrorism in General
The end of the Cold War and demise of the Soviet Union
spawned new dangers to international peace and security, most
urgently terrorism. It also allowed new cooperative forms among
former enemies to react to some of the gravest terrorist attacks
that occurred during the nineties. These precedents, bolstered by
the consociation between Security Council permanent members,
permitted the acceptance of a resolution that contained the
Council's general approach to terrorism. Passed at the end of the
decade, Resolution 1269 viewed terrorism as a new threat to
international peace and security, but it was not the first such
resolution. Prior to Resolution 1269, the Security Council had
adopted Resolutions 2864' and 63542 on aerial terrorism. These
resolutions were triggered by concrete terrorist actions against
aircraft (in fact, Resolution 635 was motivated by the Pan
American bombing); however, the Council adopted them without
reference to specific cases. Nevertheless, the resolutions' value as
precedence is rather limited given their narrow scope and the fact
that they basically only request to adopt measures to impede
armed deviations and other interference in international civil
flights.
39. S.C. Res. 1269, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4053d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1269 (1999).
40. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373
(2001). The Security Council adopted Resolution 1373 two weeks after the terrorist
attacks on New York and Washington, D.C.
41. S.C. Res. 286, U.N. SCOR, 25th Sess., 1552d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/286 (1970).
42. S.C. Res. 635, U.N. SCOR, 44th Sess., 2869th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/635 (1989).
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Resolution 1269 was supposed to be a chart for the
international community, showing the path drawn by great powers
on the topic of terrorism. At the same time, the basic elements
show that agreements within the Security Council did not
constitute a significant contribution to traditional forms of
cooperation among states.
Even if Resolution 1269 established that terrorism
"endangers the lives and well-being of individuals worldwide as
well as the peace and security of all states," it is neither within the
frame of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, nor does it refer to the
right to self-defense 3.4 Accordingly, no use of force is lawful as a
reaction to a prior terrorist attack, no matter how massive that
attack may be.
The Resolution "unequivocally condemns all acts, measures
and practices of terrorism," but because its specific condemnation
addresses only "those which could threaten international peace
and security," it indirectly admits that not all terrorist attacks
constitute such a threat.4
The Resolution requests that state parties apply existing
covenants against international terrorism and cooperate in their
framework. It also "call[s] upon" all states in general to do the
same. This is clearly a legally irrelevant request because parties
already have this duty.45 The Resolution merely advises non-
parties to consider the possibility of adopting the existing
covenants as a priority.46
It also calls upon all states to take a series of steps to prevent
and suppress both terrorist attacks47 and the preparation and
financing of all terrorist acts in their territories."8 In addition, states
43. S.C. Res. 1269, supra note 39.
44. Id. 1. From the wording of this and later resolutions, one could deduce that the
defining element of "international" terrorism is a threat to international peace and security
(while domestic terrorism would be a kind of terror that does not involve this threat). This
is a threat obviously understood, in each particular case, according to the Security
Council's discretional criteria. Moreover, for the time being, however, the latest of this
series of resolutions reaffirms that "terrorism in all its forms and manifestations
constitutes one of the most serious threats to peace and security." S.C. Res. 1456, U.N.
SCOR, 58th Sess., 4688th mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1456 (2003). The term international
is intentionally omitted both to qualify terrorism and peace and security.
45. S.C. Res. 1269, supra note 39, 3.
46. Id.
47. Id. 4.
48. Id.
2003]
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are to deny safe havens and refugee status to terrorists.49 Finally,
states are to engage in information exchange and cooperation in
judicial and administrative matters to prevent the commission of
terrorist acts.50 Again, all these requests are non-binding.
Thus, in the most important relevant resolution before
September 11th, the Security Council does not oblige states to
adopt any binding domestic or international measures against
terrorism. Nor does it state anything that was not already in force,
at least among certain countries, in the existing covenants against
international terrorism. The Resolution's value is more political
than legal. It reaffirms the issue in the Security Council's agenda,
where it had already appeared entangled among other matters,"
but this time with a monographic character. In the last paragraphs
of the Resolution, the Council announced its readiness to take the
necessary steps in the future to counter terrorist threats to
international peace and security. 2 The Resolution was a warning
against terrorist elements and supporting (rogue) states and it
reiterates that the Security Council's prior scattered practice
would become more systematic and reliable in the future. The
Security Council would take action according to its goals in
specific situations and against specific non-complying states and
actors. The General Assembly, the appropriate organ, had the
responsibility to negotiate, draft, and eventually codify the
necessary consensus on the issue in the form of a comprehensive
convention. The tragic events of September 11th overturned these
assumptions.
IV. MEASURES ADOPTED AFTER SEPTEMBER 11TH AND WAR
AGAINST TERRORISM
A. Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001)
The terrorist attacks of September 11th spurred new and
important resolutions by the Security Council. These included,
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. As early as January 31, 1992, the Security Council, meeting for the first time at the
level of heads of state and government, mentioned international terrorism as one of the
new challenges posed to the Council in the fulfillment of its responsibility to maintain
international peace and security. See S.C. Res. 748, supra note 32, 1.
52. S.C. Res. 1269, supra note 39, 6.
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centrally, Resolution 1373, but also Resolution 1368,53 adopted the
day after the attacks, and Resolutions 1377'4 and 1456, which the
Council adopted at the Ministerial level containing formal
"Declarations" on the global effort to combat terrorism.
Resolution 1368 condemns the September 11th attacks "[like]
any act of international terrorism, as a threat to international peace
and security;" it also expresses the Security Council's readiness to
take necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks."
Resolution 1377 goes one step further to declare that "acts of
international terrorism constitute one of the most serious threats to
international peace and security in the twenty-first century." While
Resolution 1456 reaffirms this principle, it concerns "terrorism in
all its forms and manifestations.
5 6
The Council expressly linked Resolution 1373 with
Resolution 1269 and the need for international cooperation
against terrorism.57 Its preamble has three important differences
with its predecessor. First, like Resolution 1368, it confirms that
any act of international terrorism constitutes a threat to
international peace and security. 8 If terrorist activities lack an
international dimension, they remain irrelevant to the Security
Council (though we shall see that this is not always true). Second,
it reaffirms the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense. There is, however, no specific linkage to the September
11th attacks or to any other past or present aggression. Finally, its
regulatory section adopts both binding measures,6° such as the
establishing of a counter-terrorism committee," and mere
recommendations. 6 These measures do not concern an armed
response to the specific attacks suffered by the United States, but
53. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368
(2001).
54. S.C. Res. 1377, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4413th mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/1377
(2001).
55. S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 53. (emphasis added).
56. S.C. Res. 1456, supra note 44, 2 (emphasis added).
57. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 40, 1.
58. S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 53, 1.
59. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 40, 1. The Resolution is framed under Chapter VII of
the UN Charter. Id.
60. Id. IT 1, 2.
61. Id. 6. The committee consists of all the members of the Security Council and
was established to monitor the implementation of the resolution.
62. Id. 3.
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with the international community's necessary cooperation in the
war against terrorism.
There are two categories of measures binding on all states.
The first category establishes the duty to prevent, suppress, and
63criminalize terrorist funding. It also obliges states to freeze
terrorists' funds and other assets and to prohibit any person within
their territories to make any economic resources in any wa
available to persons that commit or may commit terrorist acts.
The second category concerns terrorist acts themselves, as well as
persons with any participation in terrorist activities. The
Resolution establishes the duty to "refrain from providing any
form of support" to terrorists, "to prevent the commission of
terrorist acts,"65 to "[d]eny a safe haven" to terrorists, and to
"prevent their movement., 66 Foremost, the Resolution establishes
the duty to ensure that terrorist acts are serious criminal offenses
in domestic law and any person participating in them is subject to
justice, which reaffirms the principle to extradite or prosecute.67
As for the non-binding measures, the Security Council merely
"calls upon" all states to: (1) accelerate the exchange of
operational information, especially regarding actions or
movements of terrorist persons or networks; (2) cooperate to
prevent and suppress terrorist attacks and take action against
perpetrators of such attacks; (3) become parties to the relevant
international conventions relating to terrorism; and (4) avoid
granting refugee status to terrorists.68
The Resolution's actual relevance is that it overrides the
existing framework of conventional cooperation against terrorism,
that is, decades of careful and balanced negotiations among states.
Resolution 1373 is compulsory to all states and concerns
international terrorism in all its forms and modalities whereas
international treaties' preventive and repressive measures only
63. Id. T 1(a), (b).
64. Id. T 1.
65. Id. 2(a), (b).
66. Id. T 2(c), (g).
67. See S.C. Res. 1456, supra note 44. Resolution 1456, adopted by the Council
meeting at the level of foreign ministers, confirms that "states must bring to justice those
who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts or provide safe havens, in accordance
with international law, in particular on the basis of the principle to extradite or prosecute."
Id. 3.
68. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 40, 3.
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have sectoral character and apply only to state parties.69 In fact, the
Resolution's first paragraph is a copy of the 1999 Convention
Against the Financing of Terrorism's essential provisions, while
the second paragraph is directly inspired by the common
provisions of the treaties mentioned above. The Resolution also
contains aspects of the yet to be born comprehensive convention
against terrorism.70 In other words, the Security Council is
deciding, by virtue of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, that certain
international treaties are mandatory to the international
community as a whole, irrespective of its consent." The Council
does not circumscribe its decision to a particular state or situation.
Therefore, the Council is acting as a global legislator, a role that
clearly exceeds its competence within the Charter." The problem
is that the treaties on which the Resolution is based define
precisely their scope of application, while the Resolution does not
contain any definition of "international terrorism." Without a
commonly accepted notion, the Resolution will lose much of its
impact as states make their own definitions and implement their
own provisions accordingly."
It is worth mentioning that after the September 11th attacks,
further terrorist actions have deserved the attention of the
Council, but it has only condemned such attacks and expressed its
deepest sympathies and condolences to the affected people. For
example, in the recent terrorist attacks in Bali (Resolution 1438)4
Russia (Resolution 1440),"5 Kenya (Resolution 1450),76 Bogotd
69. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 40, 1 2; S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 53, 1 1; S.C. Res.
1269, supra note 39, 2.
70. See G.A. Res. 109, supra note 10, at art. 2.
71. Fernndez, supra note 26, at 296-97.
72. See Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, On the Security Council's Law Making, 83 RIVISTA
DE DIR1rro INTERNAZIONALE 609, 610-11 (Giuffre eds., 2000).
73. U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4413th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.4413 (2001). In its high-
level meeting of November 12, 2001, Mr. Cowen, Foreign Minister of Ireland of the
Security Council, insisted on the need to arrive as soon as possible on a precise definition
of international terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, while urging every state to
sign and ratify the existing legal instruments. Mr. Colin Powell, though, was not so keen
on the issue of definition. After describing the September 11th attacks, he said, "Those
who seek to define terrorism need look no further.... It was an attack on civilization and
religion themselves. This is what terrorism means." Id. at 16. These are undoubtedly
powerful words, but useless in a legal context.
74. S.C. Res. 1438, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4624th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1438
(2002).
75. S.C. Res. 1440, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4632d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1440 (2002).
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(Resolution 1465), 77 and Madrid (Resolution 1530)78 the Council
referred to what it already considers the current general norm on
the fight against international terrorism, that is, Resolution 1373.
B. Operation Enduring Freedom
As we have observed, the armed action taken by the United
States and the United Kingdom against Afghanistan's Taliban
regime between October and December 2001, together with their
continued presence in the area until the present day, is neither
explicitly authorized nor supported by Resolution 13739. Instead,
the coexisting International Security Assistance Force (ISAF),
established by Resolution 1386, has an explicit, though very
limited, mandate to assist the new Afghan authorities in
maintaining security in Kabul and surrounding areas.8° Thus, the
issue is whether the use of force against the Taliban regime and al
Qaeda, under the name of Enduring Freedom, is lawful, and under
what international law grounds. Scholars favor two arguments,
self-defense and consent by invitation."'
1. Self-defense?
The general approach to the lawfulness of Enduring Freedom
has been to consider the joint military operation as a means of
76. S.C. Res. 1450, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4667th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1450
(2002).
77. S.C. Res. 1456, supra note 44.
78. S.C. Res. 1530, U.N. SCOR, 59 ' Sess., 4923d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1530 (2004).
79. Michael Byers, Terrorism, the Use of Force and International Law After 11
September, 51 INT'L & COMP L.Q. 401, 401-02 (2002).
80. S.C. Res. 1386, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4443d mtg., 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1386
(2001). Resolution 1444 has extended this mission until the end of 2003. S.C. Res. 1444,
U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4651st mtg., at 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1444 (2002).
81. Byers, supra note 79, at 401-06; RICHARD FALK, THE GREAT TERROR WAR 9,
59. (2003). Byers adds, for the sake of discussion and without actually making a case, two
more possible arguments: (1) some sort of hidden authorization to use force by Security
Council Resolution 1373, and (2) humanitarian intervention. Byers, supra, at 401-06. On
the other hand, though supportive of the self-defense argument, Richard Falk prefers to
frame the U.S.-U.K. action under the "just war" doctrine. FALK, supra, at 66, 124. This is a
view that I think cannot be sustained under modern international law and which runs the
risk, which Falk himself acknowledges, of justifying actions that go well beyond this
approach: "What makes this issue so serious is that the United States by its actions as
global leader sets precedents that are available to others for use in quite different
circumstances with far less justification." Id. at 97. For instance, "an American attack on
Iraq is impossible to justify as a proportionate response to September 11 or because Iraq
might in the future help at Qaeda launch future attacks." Id. at 125.
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collective self-defense against the prior attack on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon. In fact, this interpretation derives from
the Security Council's reminder of this inherent right in the
preambles of Resolutions 1368 and 1373, and from the
international community's general acceptance of this approach .
This theory, however, has a number of problems. According to
well-established international law,83 self-defense constitutes a
proportional and necessary armed response to a prior or imminent
armed attack, which is directed to stop and reject such prior or
imminent attack. Thus, only an armed attack can be the basis for
self-defense, and not on any other form of use of force. Even so,
the armed response must meet a number of requirements in order
for the alleged self-defense to be lawful.
Traditionally, a terrorist attack would not justify a military
attack against a sovereign state.TM This notion does not contradict
the fact that the use of one state's territory to harbor terrorist
groups constitutes an unlawful "use of force" that is forbidden by
the UN Charter.85 It simply means that such use of force does not
amount to an "aggression" within the meaning of Resolution
82. S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 53, 1; S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 40, 1. See Luigi
Condorelli, Les Attentats du 11 Septembre et Leurs Suites: 01 va le Droit International?,
105 REVUE GtNtRAL DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 829, 840 (2001) (analyzing the
debates at the General Assembly and confirming the general acquiescence of Member
states to the self-defense argument). Although these opinions are important, the ICJ has
reminded us that "[t]he mere fact that states declare their recognition of certain rules is
not sufficient for the Court to consider these as being part of customary international law,
and as applicable as such to those states." Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua
v. United States), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 97 (June 27). Nevertheless, Ratner sees this acquiescence
as "highly significant as an indication of contemporary expectations - suggesting
something from tolerance to embrace the U.S. legal position," to finally conclude that
"[the United States has been given leeway with respect to its initial reaction to September
11 because of the gravity of the attack and the flexibility of the norms in the Charter
regarding self-defense," but that "tolerance for an expansive view of jus ad bellum is not
infinitely elastic." Steven R. Ratner, Jus Ad Bellum and Jus in Bello after September 11, 96
AM. J. INT'L L. 905, 910, 920-21 (2002).
83. B. Welling Hall, Terrorist Attacks on World Trade Center and the Pentagon:
Addendum Relating to Self-Defense, ASIL INSIGHTS (Sept. 2001), available at
http://www.asil.org/insightslinsigh77.htm. ("[A]uthoritative views in international law
about what constitutes legitimate self-defense [exist] .... In response [to the Caroline
Case], Secretary of State Daniel Webster made the now classic formulation that there
must be 'a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming leaving no choice of means,
and no moment for deliberation' and that responsive measures must be neither
'unreasonable' nor 'excessive'.").
84. S.C. Res. 1269, supra note 39 (confirming this approach).
85. G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 15, at art. 1.
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3314.86 In this case, however, the "scale and effects, 87 of the force
used by the terrorists justifies a departure from this general rule.
September 11th was the most deadly terrorist attack in history,
claiming more victims than some full-fledged wars.88 In my view,
this was an act of "aggression," '89 even if it is difficult to accept that
a non-state actor can be legally responsible for such an act.9°
The armed response must satisfy the conditions of necessity,
proportionality, and immediateness. Armed response is a means
to stop and reject the armed attack that is subsidiary to the action
of the Security Council.92 The self-defense argument is problematic
because it fails to satisfy these requirements. It is in the meeting of
these requirements that I find most problems in accepting the self-
defense argument.
Operation Enduring Freedom was launched on October 7,
2001, almost one month after the September 11th attacks93 In the
86. Id. at art. 3(g) ("The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups,
irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of
such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.").
In our case, everything tends to prove that there was not a "sending" by the Taliban
government, but rather "acquiescence" with the perpetrators of the crime. This is a
behavior that nevertheless constitutes an unlawful use of force attributable to the former
Afghan government. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 15.
87. Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 93.
88. For instance, the Falkland War, between Argentine and the United Kingdom, in
1982, provoked approximately 900 death casualties. MARTIN MIDDLEBROOK, THE FIGHT
FOR THE 'MALVINAS': THE ARGENTINE FORCES IN THE FALKLANDS WAR 282-83 (1989).
The 1999 Kosovo intervention by NATO resulted in a little over 500 casualties. Civilian
Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign, HUM. RTS. WATCH REP., (Feb. 2000), available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/20O0/nato/index.htm.
89. Javier A. Gonzalez Vega, Los Atentados del 11 de Septiembre, La Operacion
Libertad Duradera y El Derecho de Legitima Defensa, 53 REVISITA ESPAf4OLA DE
DERENCHO INTERNACIONAL 247, 251 (2001). As Falk puts it, "September 11, as widely
observed, more closely resembles the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor than any previous
terrorist event, and thereby sharpened the dominant perception that the attacks needed to
be treated as acts of war rather than a disruptive, essentially symbolic, terrorist incidents."
FALK, supra note 81, at 53.
90. Schrijver notes that "the hijacking and deliberately planned and simultaneous use
of various large passenger aircraft, fully loaded with fuel, as flying bombs to attack New
York's most prestigious buildings as well as the Pentagon (the nerve centre of the
American military), may well be viewed as an 'armed attack' against the United States, if
these words are to retain a relevance to new forms of violence." Schrijver, supra note 20,
at 285.
91. Id.
92. U.N. CHARTER art. 41.
93. Gonzalez Vega, supra note 89, at 249.
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meantime, there was investigation on the origin of the attack,94 as
well as talks with the Taliban regime to surrender Osama bin
Laden.95 Consequently, the armed response was not immediate,
unless there was any evidence (which, in any case, has not been
disclosed) of an imminent new attack coming from the same
source. Rather it was an act of retaliation. Self-defense requires
immediateness, and negotiation requires paused conversations and
an appropriate environment; therefore, they sound like
incompatible notions.96
It is arguable that the military operation against the Taliban
regime was the only means, or rather, a necessity, in stopping an
attack that was instantaneous and already finished. It is also
doubtful that the armed response's intensity, including the
overthrow of a government and the occupation of a country, is
consistent with the proportionality requirement. Despite some
official statements, 97 there is evidence of violations of international
humanitarian law norms. These norms are unconditional and
require deference even if the enemy does not comply with them.
Finally, the action's purpose was not to reject the attack but to
search and capture the terrorist aggressors and dismantle what had
become a haven for terrorists.
Theoretically, the September 11th attacks could have justified
self-defense. The argument to legally justify the use of force
against Afghanistan's Taliban government, however, is weak
because of the circumstances of the attack (instant in nature and of
unknown origin) and of the armed response (neither proportional
nor aimed at rejecting the attack). The Security Council's implicit
support of this argument constitutes a surrender of its
responsibilities according to the UN Charter; the right to self-
defense exists only after the Council takes appropriate and
effective action on the matter.98 On the contrary, here the
94. Letter Dated 7 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the United
States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council,
U.N. Doc. S/2001/946 (2001) [hereinafter Letter Dated 7 October 2001].
95. See FALK, supra note 81, at 65.
96. See Byers, supra note 79, at 405-06.
97. Letter Dated 7 October 2001, supra note 94, at 1-2.
98. FALK, supra note 81, at 59 ("In general, the UN Security Council did seem to
endorse the right of the US to make an effective response, but in very general terms that
left full operational discretion in Washington, thereby abandoning any responsibility for
assuring that an American response respected appropriate limits on the use of force.").
20031
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
"defending" nations inform the Council of the military action 99 and
the latter avoids taking any action, instead leaving all
responsibility to the former.'0 Moreover, "the extension of the
right of self-defense to include action against states actively
supporting or willingly harbouring terrorists raises difficult issues
of evidence and authority."'0 ' In the context of a passive or
blocked Security Council, "who decides that there is sufficient
evidence of State complicity to justify the use of military force?
'"'0 2
2. Consent?
The doctrine of consent is a different argument that could
support the legality of the armed United States and United
Kingdom action in Afghanistan. In fact, this argument could easily
justify the continued presence of Enduring Freedom troops
(different from the ISAF troops, even if the United Kingdom is
involved in both operations) since January 2002. Arguably, the
new Afghan government has invited these countries to assist their
own meager forces to control the territory and search for Taliban
activists. The continued presence of foreign troops and their
sporadic armed actions during this period would be undertaken
through consent and therefore is not unlawful.'03
Extending the same argument to the prior action against the
Taliban government is difficult. The United Kingdom, United
States, and most importantly the UN have not recognized this
government.' 4 Thus, the use of force against the Taliban could be
a response to a call by the legitimate Afghan government sitting at
the UN, a government that the so-called "Northern Alliance"
99. U.N. CHARTER art. 51 ("Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right
of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council .... ).
100. FALK, supra note 81, at 59. It must be underlined that this line of (non) action was
again widely accepted by all permanent and non-permanent members of the Council in
the high-level meeting of November 12, 2001. Even if only two states mentioned expressis
verbis the right to self-defense (France and Norway), the rest were absolutely supportive.
Only Bangladesh poured some criticism in the role of the Council when saying "it has
become all the more necessary for the Council to play its role in a balanced, creative and
proactive manner, in line with its Charter obligations." U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4413th
mtg., at 18, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4413 (2001).
101. Byers, supra note 79, at 413.
102. Id.
103. We would probably draw a different conclusion if referring to the respect of
international humanitarian law in the course and context of such armed actions (especially
concerning the treatment of prisoners of war).
104. See Byers, supra note 79, at 403-04; FALK, supra note 81, at 59.
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incarceratedib Although it may be more persuasive than the self-
defense argument, this reasoning still has problems.
Since 1996, the Northern Alliance controlled less than ten
percent of the Afghan territory, and thus arguably, was not an
effective government.'06 Moreover, the Northern Alliance's
legitimacy is questionable because although somewhat more
egalitarian than the Taliban regime, its creation was not based on
any sort of democratic election. Thus, it is considerably nothing
more than another Afghan faction fighting for national power. In
fact, the post-Taliban government is not a mere Northern Alliance
political wing conglomeration, rather it is the result of lengthy
negotiations among four Afghan (non-Taliban) factions leading to
the Bonn Agreements in December 2001.1°7
According to the International Law Commission's Draft
Articles on State Responsibility, consent constitutes a
circumstance that precludes wrongfulness. In this case, there can
be no allegation of the circumstances described in the project
when they refer to jus cogens norms, of which the principle of
prohibition of force constitutes a paradigmatic example., The
consent in this particular situation was merely implicit since the
new Afghan government has only officially asked for military
cooperation in December 2001."o It is doubtful that implied
consent is enough to justify the military action of foreign troops in
a sovereign country or that this consent has retroactive character.
My conclusion is that despite the September 11th terrorist
attacks, and the permanent threat of new aggressions of this sort,
the unilateral use of force against Afghanistan cannot be lawful.
Disappointingly, in this particular case, it would have been very
easy to overthrow the Taliban and search for al Qaeda members in
105. See Michael P. Scharf & Paul R. Williams, Report of the Committee of Experts on
Nation Rebuilding in Afghanistan, 36 NEw ENG. L. REV. 709,718 (2002).
106. See Juan R. Torruella, On the Slippery Slopes of Afghanistan: Military
Commissions and the Exercise of Presidential Power, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 648, 693 (2002).
107. See Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law Legal Regulation of Use of Force: Terrorist Attacks on World Trade
Center and Pentagon, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 237, 251-52 (2002).
108. G.A. Res. 56/83, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 502, U.N. Doc. A/56/49
(2001).
109. Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 110.
110. See Press Release, U.N., SC/7248, Security Council Authorizes International
Security Force for Afghanistan: Welcomes United Kingdom's Offer to be the Initial Lead
Nation (Dec. 20, 2001), at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7248.doc.htm.
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Afghanistan in a legal, institutionally backed manner. In effect,
Afghanistan (or its de facto government) had committed a serious
breach of international law. Its permissiveness toward well-known
terrorist entities' activities was, according to general international
law, tantamount to authorship of the terrorist attacks of
September 11th.
There were many reasons for the Security Council to act
against the Taliban regime before September 11th: the Taliban
government was itself a threat to the international peace and
security; further, during the few years that they were in power,
they probably had the worst record of human rights violations in
the world.' At anytime before or after September 11th, the
Security Council could have justified a collective armed action
against the Taliban. Before this date, political interests, including
the support of Pakistan (a United States ally in the area), barred
the Security Council from adopting anything more than economic
sanctions and general condemnations against the country and its
outrageous policies.112 After September 11th, support for United
States and United Kingdom force against the Taliban would have
undoubtedly obtained a unanimous vote in the Council."3 A
resolution of this sort was not adopted only because the relevant
states did not look for it. They preferred to act on their own
without seeking legal support from the rest of the world. This
attitude constituted willful unilateralism by a hegemonic power in
a case where, unlike the Kyoto Protocol or the International
Criminal Court, the international community was ready to support
its initiatives."4
V. CONCLUSION
The international community needs to strengthen cooperation
against the scourge of domestic and international terrorism. The
111. See Human Rights Watch, Paying for the Taliban's Crimes: Abuses Against Ethnic
Pashtuns in Northern Afghanistan (Apr. 2002), at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/
afghan2/afghan04O2.pdf.
112. See Stephen Coates, Pakistan Fears Fallout from UN's Afghan Sanctions,
AGENCE FR. PRESSE (Aug. 23, 2001), at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/
afgnstan/2001/ 0823pak.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2004).
113. See Walter B. Slocombe, Preemptive Military Action and the Legislative Use of
Force: An American Perspective (Jan. 13, 2003), at http://www.eusec.org/slocombe.htm.
114. See Reyko Huang, Fact Sheet: International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in
Afghanistan, http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/isaf.cfm (last modified Feb. 14, 2002).
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partial treaties adopted so far are an important step in that
direction, but the recent threat posed by global terrorism
demonstrates the urgent need for a new and comprehensive global
agreement against terrorism. The appropriate body to negotiate
and draft such a convention is the General Assembly and its
subsidiary bodies."' The appropriate instrument is an international
convention, mutually agreed upon by as many members of the
international community as possible. The Security Council's
actions, though needed and useful in specific situations, cannot
substitute the law-making power of the sovereign states. The role
of the Security Council is not to become a global legislative power.
When it tries to do so, it performs this function in a deficient
manner. Without a commonly agreed upon definition of
international terrorism, cooperation, even with the Council's
binding command, would be ineffective.
On the other hand, the action of the Security Council is still
essential to authorize and legitimize the use of armed force in
international relations. Notwithstanding the attacks against the
United States, there can be no legal justification for operation
Enduring Freedom without the Council's explicit consent.
Concededly, the vast majority of countries have accepted the self-
defense argument. Neither the United States nor the United
Kingdom has faced immense legal criticism because of this military
operation.'17 The problem is rather one of attitude and precedent.
Even where there were sufficient arguments and political will to
justify an institutional action against the Taliban regime, the
United States and the United Kingdom preferred to undertake a
unilateral operation and avoid control from the Security Council.
In the aftermath of September 11th, we have lost an opportunity
to renew the international commitment to the creation of a new
world order based on international law. Not only would this new
order have required that facts and evidence justify the use of force,
115. G.A. Res. 57/27, supra note 25, at 1 (reaffirming its power to deal with the topic
by stating its convincement "of the importance of measures to eliminate international
terrorism by the General Assembly as the universal organ having competence to do so").
116. See S.C. Res. 1456, supra note 44. The Security Council agrees that "terrorism can
only be defeated, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international
law, by a sustained comprehensive approach involving the active participation and
collaboration of all states, international and regional organizations, and by redoubled
efforts at the national level." Id. at 2.
117. Brian J. Foley, U.S. Campaign Against Afghanistan Not Self-Defense Under
International Law, http://www.zmag.org.foleylegal.htm.
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as they certainly did in this case, but this order would have also
given the use legitimacy through institutional approval.
Barcelona - Los Angeles, April 2003
